set" at the time may have influenced his actions. This was that the United States was out to "get him." Looking back at the events of 1965 and 1966, Nasser's conclusion is understandable. U.S. wheat deliveries had been withheld. Re scheduling of Egypt's debts was delayed. U.S. promised grain silos went unbuilt, and then Secretary of State Dean Rusk did not make a promised visit to Cairo. Nasser's own fiery rhetorical attacks on U.S. Middle East policies further weakened his cause in the United States (Parker, 185).
In a century that witnessed many humiliations and tragedies, no event stands out more than the defeat of 1967 and the ensuing five years until the crossing of the canal in October 1973. Only against the background of the June 1967 defeat, dubbed by the Egyptians the "Setback," can the significance of the October victory, 25 years on, be truly understood (Love, 266).
The five year period between the "humiliating" defeat and "glorious" victory left its mark on the collective conscious of the Arab nation. When Israel showed no inclination to withdraw its military forces, which had dug in along the east bank of the Suez Canal, Egyptian forces began shelling them and sending small harassing parties across the canal. These actions began to inflict casualties on the Israelis. Israel responded with deep penetration air raids against Egyptian population centers to pressure Nasser to stop (Parker, 223).
Nasser turned to Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin. Kosygin warned President Richard Nixon, in effect, that he would provide Egypt with the wherewithal to rebuff Israeli attacks. Kosygin's "bluff' was rejected by Nixon under the influence of National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger.
When Soviet SAM ground to air missiles began appearing in Egyptian defenses, and Soviet pilots started patrolling Egyptian skies, the American and Israeli officials realized they had miscalculated. Israel was forced to seek a cease fire or ...