ducated in the West and is undoubtedly familiar with strands of thought flowing from Locke and Marx. Thus it is not as if the secular discourses of the Western liberal tradition, including those of Locke and Marx on freedom, are somehow to be artificially and unfairly set beside Islamic law and its provenance in the religious thought of the Koran. Indeed, the political discourse of Turabi himself is as available as any other for interpretation and evaluation; for whatever else Islamic law is, it too is an interpretation and evaluation of social, cultural, and political norms. There is also the matter of Turabi's own articulation of Islam-as-system, which may indirectly offer comfort to those in the West who, in light of late First World-Third World antipathy and Sudan's official designation as a terrorist state, might be forgiven for viewing discourse with Islam as an impossible dream.
[Turabi] says he turned to Islam because without it, "Sudan has no identity, no direction." He calls his regime an "Islamic experiment" and says it is leading toward a
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