Monadology System of Leibniz

This research provides a working definition of monad, with reference to Leibniz's text, and discusses how Leibniz develops his argument for monads as fundamental metaphysical concepts. This analysis of monads explores strengths and weaknesses of the argument, based on whether the philosophical premises are true, sound, or coherent. As appropriate, possible objections to and evaluations of Leibniz's metaphysical construct are suggested.

Whether Leibniz's philosophical premises are true cannot be answered with surety either affirmatively or negatively. Competing philosophical systems could question the validity of monadology and demonstrate their own validity in a way that could point up deficiencies in Leibniz's approach. But this does not mean that Leibniz's scheme of thought is incapable of establishing a structure for considering fundamental metaphysical questions of truth, knowledge, understanding, or even ethics or aesthetics. What does seem clear is that Leibniz intends his concept of monads to account for difficulties with various metaphysical conceptions of reality. But it is legitimate to scrutinize and test Leibniz's own theories.

Leibniz's approach has strong internal logic. One purpose of his argument is to demonstrate the preeminence of logic, concerned with mental activity, as a fundamental principle. Leibniz believes that all knowledge and perception lie implicit in the mind, even while it is unconscious; in a faint or in dreamless sleep, "it does not at al

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ature" (631). But he also argues that the monad is subject to change and that the change is continual. Such natural changes he attributes to an "internal principle" (631). Now something either changes or it doesn't. Therefore it is tempting to suggest that Leibniz cannot get his story straight. But one must distinguish between change as the result of external force, which Leibniz says is impossible for monads to experience, and change confined to the monad itself. Leibniz cites "a plurality of properties and relations in the simple substance, although it has no parts" (632). We can compare a monad to an atom and the plurality of properties to electrons, protons, and neutrons, which physics tells us are constantly in motion. We may set aside the fact that these atomic properties have been further split and reduced by science. Leibniz appears to be arguing that fundamental realities are in some sense relative, unchangeable substance when compared to the wash of ever-changing experience but within themselves, as "incorporeal automata" (632), shifting moment to moment in the cosmic scheme. Thus, too, the monad's internal logic makes it a vital (i.e., not dead) principle of reality. This is the basis for Leibniz's term appetition, w

Category: Philosophy - M