Israeli Strategy in the War of 1967

The purpose of this research is to analyze the strategy of the Israeli air campaign during the Six-Day Arab-Israeli War of 1967. The analysis is developed in three separate but related discussions. The first of these discussions deals with the background to the Arab-Israeli War of 1967. Disputes between Israel and the neighboring Arab countries were not novel by 1967, and this war did not occur in a political vacuum. [3:84] The second discussion reviews the events of the Six-Day War. This review covers the initiation of the war and both the land air campaigns, although the area of emphasis is the air campaign. The third discussion analyzes the Israeli strategy in the conduct of the air campaign as well as the overall war effort. The air campaign was critical to the success of the Israeli effort in the Six-Day War; however, the strategy of the air campaign was a part of the overall strategy. [19:63-82]

The analysis of the Israeli strategy is performed within the context of the Mowbray Strategy Analysis Model. [10:16-20] Guidance in the analysis of strategy also was obtained from Collins' "Essence of Strategy." [6:10-15] The Mowbray Model analyzes strategy from "threat" to "strategic objectives," and is designed to assess the strategy of an historical campaign, as opposed to predicting a successful future strategy. As such, the model is particularly appropriate for the purpose of this researc

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ael immediately struck back at Jordan, and in a three-day offensive, captured the Old City of Jerusalem, destroyed Jordan's army, and occupied the entire West Bank. Even before the last battle against Jordan was fought, the Israel Defence Forces turned their attention the Syrians, who assumed their position on the Golan Heights to be impregnable. The Israeli ground forces stormed the Golan Heights while the Israeli Air Force pounded the Syrians who soon were defeated. [18:242-249] Israel's air strategy had it source in the vision of the country's first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, "who foresaw the crucial role of air power in Israel's security·long before the capabilities of its air force matched his vision." [17:25] Ben-Gurion understood that Israel's standing army would always be relatively small and that "it would take a hundred hours for the reserves to be fully mobilized and moved into battle. Ben-Gurion declared that in that vulnerable period it would be up to the air force to protect the nation and carry the battle to the enemy." [17:25] Ahron Remez, the first commander of Israel's Air Force declared some 10 years before the Six-Day War that the "air force is not an auxiliary of the ground forces! It is a decisi
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Some common words found in the essay are:
Arab Republic, Six-Day War, Air Force, Defence Forces, Mowbray Model, Tiran Nasser, Syria Jordan, BACKGROUND CAMPAIGN, Republic Syrian, Soviet Union, united arab, arab republic, united arab republic, air force, six-day war, israeli air, israeli air force, israel defence, air campaign, defence forces, israel defence forces, war 1967, golan heights, arab republic air, republic syria jordan,
Approximate Word count = 4183
Approximate Pages = 17 (250 words per page)

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