THE ISRAELI AIR CAMPAIGN STRATEGY IN THE SIX-DAY WAR OF 1967
The purpose of this research is to analyze the strategy of the Israeli air campaign during the Six-Day Arab-Israeli War of 1967. The analysis is developed in three separate but related discussions. The first of these discussions deals with the background to the Arab-Israeli War of 1967. Disputes between Israel and the neighboring Arab countries were not novel by 1967, and this war did not occur in a political vacuum. [3:84] The second discussion reviews the events of the Six-Day War. This review covers the initiation of the war and both the land air campaigns, although the area of emphasis is the air campaign. The third discussion analyzes the Israeli strategy in the conduct of the air campaign as well as the overall war effort. The air campaign was critical to the success of the Israeli effort in the Six-Day War; however, the strategy of the air campaign was a part of the overall strategy. [19:63-82]
The analysis of the Israeli strategy is performed within the context of the Mowbray Strategy Analysis Model. [10:16-20] Guidance in the analysis of strategy also was obtained from Collins' "Essence of Strategy." [6:10-15] The Mowbray Model analyzes strategy from "threat" to "strategic objectives," and is designed to assess the strategy of an historical campaign, as opposed to predicting a successful future strategy. As such, the model is particularly appropriate for the purpose of this research.
The thesis of this research is that Israel opted for a pre-emptive strike strategy because of the nature of the threat posed by the United Arab Republic, Syria, and Jordan. In the absence of a pre-emptive strike, Israel's planners were unsure of the capability of the Israel Defence Forces to emerge victorious against the combined Arab force.
At the root of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the is the issue of whose rights are being trampled on, or are being upheld in Pa...