y involved in both phases. The categories of murders have been limited by identifying six to twelve aggravating circumstances, at least one of which must be found in order for the defendant to be eligible for the death penalty. These aggravating circumstances typically include murders committed while the defendant is engaged in the commission of a rape, robbery, kidnapping, or burglary, and murders which are committed in a particularly wanton or vile manner. Bifurcation of the trial requires the jury to first find the defendant guilty of capital murder then hear evidence regarding the appropriate sentence (Baldous, Woodworth, & Pulaski, 1990, p. 22-23).
Because the death penalty must be proportionate to the kind of offense committed by the defendant, it is widely assumed that a murder must have been committed (McCleskey v. Kemp, 1987). Thus, a rape must have been accompanied by the death of the victim in order for a defendant to be eligible for the death penalty (Coker v. Georgia, 1977); the same goes for a robbery (Enmund v. Florida, 1982; Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 1990). In 1988, a federal drug law was passed which authorized the death penalty for drug crimes involving murders; it has been argued, however, that the death penalty should be extended to other crimes under that law, even though they do not involve homicides (Reske, 1991). No further action has been taken on such suggestions.
The Furman decision itself and the decisions beginning with Gregg have suggested three grounds for challenging the constitutionality of the manner in which post-Furman death penalty systems are applied. First, a system may be challenged on the grounds that the death sentence is excessive when imposed for certain crimes, violating the cruel and unusual punishment provision of the Eighth Amendment. Thus, imposing the death sentence in a case involving a domestic homicide may be excessive in a state where most convictions for domestic homic...