U.S./Soviet Intelligence Communities

Indeed, recent revelations concerning information gathering policy within the U.S. intelligence community during the Reagan and Bush Administrations indicate that personal ideology framed by pre-and-post World War II Soviet-American relations took precedence over objective analysis of raw data. One need not wonder, then, at the almost two year delay by George Bush, a former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, in embracing Mikhail Gorbachev in 1990 as an ally in the quest for world peace: Bush's entire career had been colored by the rhetoric of confrontation with the "Evil Empire" (to use his predecessor, Ronald Reagan's, scripted words). To overcome such ideological anchors and recognize a Soviet political leader as a legitimate proponent of cooperation was as much an upheaval of world reality for the American president as the tear-down of the Berlin Wall had been for Germans only months earlier.

The former states of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are also in disarray concerning

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GB, eventually, the KGB - all under Beria's direction. It should be noted that the primary focus was still domestic: Stalin distrusted foreign communist organizations, particularly after the "independence" proclaimed by the Yugoslav communist, Marshall Tito, in 1948. Jockeying for power among the Party elite in Moscow consumed much attention; the KGB was the premier's best tool for maintaining his position. It took the rise of Nikita Khrushchev - and the fall of Lavrenty Beria - to finally break this connection. Yet even during the relatively liberal Khrushchev era the KGB maintained its attraction to the leadership as an instrument for preserving personal power; indeed, one justification given for the ousting of Khrushchev by his successors Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin were fears that Khrushchev sought to establish himself as absolute dictator with Stalinist powers. The new leaders, for whatever reason more secure in their positions, directed the KGB's interests to new levels of activity abroad. The KGB, however, retained an institutional interest in the internal power-politics game: Yuri Andropov moved from head of the KGB to - in the early 1980s - the head of the Soviet Union; during the aborted putsch of 1991
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Some common words found in the essay are:
Ukrainia Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan Ukraine, Nixon CIA, War II, Ivan Terrible, Soviet Union's, Cold War, American Russian, Pat Buchanan's, Internal Affairs, intelligence communities, soviet union, world war, national security, former soviet, boris yeltsin, world war ii, war ii, former soviet union, cia policy, muslim fundamentalist, information gathering, central intelligence agency,
Approximate Word count = 2305
Approximate Pages = 9 (250 words per page)