two children drowning even if another potential rescuer is present but decides not to help in the rescue. Murphy argues that there is a clear conclusion to be drawn here---that the individual owes the drowning child more than a distant starving person---but
some account of this relationship is needed if we hope to justify the commonsense response that my failure to save (at little cost) a person drowning in front of me is morally much worse than my failure to save (certainly, and at the same little cost) the lives of far-off people (Murphy 65a).
What Murphy, Singer and Nell are trying to do is not argue theoretically about some abstract issue. They are trying to fashion and ethical standard whereby individuals in the world who have surplus time and money will feel bound to contribute some of that time and money to saving starving people they do not know on the other side of the world.
Just as there is something effective that the individu
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