elf-determination. The thrust of her argument, however, is much broader, applying potentially not only to the familiar understanding of self-determination as applied to national states, but to the meaning of individual rights and freedom as well. Young is quite aware of these broader implications, but it is useful to start with the specific example she uses.
In the late 1990s, the Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians, in Utah, asserted that its communal right of self-determination allowed it to accept payment in turn for permitting a nuclear-waste storage site on Goshute land (pp. 41-42). At once, two quite reasonable propositions of rights were placed in conflict: that of the Goshutes to use their land in their own best interest, and that of their Utah neighbors not to be subjected to the unpredictable hazards of nearby nuclear-waste storage.
In addressing this problem, Young argues in essence that the traditional understanding of self-determination, as originally applied to nation-states, is an atomistic one. A state can do whatever it wishes within its territory, without outside interference, with no fundamental obligation under traditional international law save to refrain from attacking its neighbors. (Other obligations are only accepted by entry into treaties, from which they can withdraw.) Young suggests that in an increasingly interdependent world this model is no longer really applicable.
In real life, states -- and still less smaller communities claiming rights of self-determination -- have no practical option to stand aside in autarkic isolation from the world. Thus, suggests Young, self-determination should be understood not as absolute freedom from noninterference, but as freedom from dominating interference. Defining this is obviously a matter of endless complexity, but the principle may co
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