f Colombia (FARC), collapsed." At that point, "Uribe's message struck a chord: It was time to build up the armed forces, confront the leftist rebels, and restore the government's authority" (Ospina).
After his election, Uribe gave some signs of seeking negotiations with the rebels, in his first speech and in cabinet selections, such as that of a human rights advocate. These nods toward peace, or reconciliation, proved to be false but effective in trying to present a policy of at least being willing to negotiate.
After three years of fruitless talks with the FARC, voters saw in Uribe's radical vision no dialogue before a cease fire a fresh tactic. "For the first time, a president didn't put the issue in terms of 'carrots and sticks'. . . . ," asserted [one analyst] (Ospina).
Villelabeitia examines another aspect of Uribe's policy which appears fresh but is in fact more evidence that he seeks defeat of the rebels rather than peace. Uribe's government "plans to recruit and arm 20,000 'peasant soldiers' to fight Marxist rebels a
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