orea either in body or in spirit.
And yet, massive deployments would ensue, with legions upon legions of untrained, unmotivated, and undisciplined Americans entering into a state of war in which their largely illiterate and lesser-equipped Korean and Chinese counterparts were lying in wait (Fehrenbach, 1963, p. 200-203). The introduction of U.S. ground combat forces was essential in Korea- as one of General MacArthurÆs early cables to Washington succinctly stated: ôTo continue to utilize the forces of our Air and Navy without an effective ground element cannot be decisiveö (Fehrenbach, 1963, p. 57).
In a Cold War world, the American psyche would thus be forced to contend with this troubling and enduring fact: in spite of atomic capabilities (ôpushbuttonö warfare according to Fehrenbach (1963, p. 290-294)), Americans would still be forced to fight on the ground. On this point, FehrenbachÆs work is extremely emphatic not only because the Korean War was an example of this theory, but also because in an Atomic age, ôpushbutton warfare meant Armageddonö (Fehrenbach, 1963, p. 290).
FehrenbachÆs account of the Korean War is thus a study in an ideology as well as an overview of a prolonged military campaign. One overarching contention serves to explain the nature of the war in Korea, if not to justify it:
He writes, ôàyou may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life- but if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the groundà by putting your young men in the mudö (Fehrenbach, 1963, p. 290).
Fehrenbach thus explains the necessity of the kind of campaign that was waged in Korea.
In this philosophy he is able to make sense of his book, which is engineered to be a platoon leaderÆs book (and not, he maintains, a GeneralÆs book). This theme of FehrenbachÆs- that opting out of an all-out atomic assault make...