of the immediate awareness of objects. This immediate consciousness comes to us already divided into discrete elements, this sensation, this, and this, and so on. Husserl was not arguing that scientific truth was not truth but only that such truth was "rooted in the same world that we all engage in our everyday lives and with our unaided senses--that, for all its technological refinements, quantitative science remains an expression of, and hence must be guided by, the qualitative world of our common experience" (Abram 43).
McLuhan, of course, approaches the issue differently, emphasizing not that technology is mediated by common sensory experience but rather than common sensory experience is altered by technological capabilities:
Any invention or technology is an extension or self-amputation of our physical bodies, and such extension also demands new ratios or new equilibriums among the other organs and extensions of the body (McLuhan 45).
McLuhan sees this truth as shaping us in ways we may not readily perceive ourselves and might not want to recognize:
By continuously embracing technologies, we relate ourselves to them as servomechanisms. That is why we must, to use them at all, serve these objects, these extensions of ourselves, as gods or minor religions (McLuhan 46).
Abram would certainly not accept this latter statement.
He considers the more radical approach of Merleau-Pon
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