MISSED OPPORTUNITIES TO END THE VIETNAM WAR
This research paper discusses whether opportunities existed to end the Vietnam War, the reasons for the failure of various peace initiatives and the implications for the avoidance of future conflicts.
From late 1946 and until the Fall of Saigon in the spring of 1975, Vietnam was almost continuously embroiled in a war of fearsome destructive power and fateful consequences for its principal participants. Except for the Geneva Agreement of 1954 which produced a fitful armed truce which lasted several years, all other peace initiatives failed before the Paris Peace Accords were signed in early 1973. At various junctures decisions were taken by the principal decision makers involved which affected the character, intensity and scope of the war. They failed to bring peace to Vietnam because at least one side and often both sides to the struggle saw more advantage from the vantage point of their interests and perspectives on the struggle in continuing the war than in ending it. With the benefit of hindsight, a persuasive argument can be made that the war did not serve the interests of the vast majority of the persons actually engaged in or directly affected by it, Vietnamese, French and American, who became its principal victims. The perspectives and considerations of national interest which prevented peace initiatives from having much of a chance were sometimes flawed by misjudgments and misperceptions of reality, especially in 1946, 1964-1965 and 1969-1970, but they nevertheless prevailed. Wars of such magnitude are likely to recur unless policy makers learn to appreciate better the essential nature of the conflicts they embark upon before they reach the stage where rational compromise becomes impossible.
The Unnecessary French Indo-China War (1946-1954
Failure of Franco-Vietnamese Negotiations in 1946-1948. The primary reason why negotiations between France and the Democratic Rep...