early stages. This was something the South Vietnamese government was not at all disposed to do. Indeed, the problem of whether the United States, in even doing so much as sending out "peace feelers" for prospective negotiations, would be doing so over the head -- or behind the back -- of its South Vietnamese ally was a problem that bedeviled American policymakers throughout.
Preventive negotiations in the period before American escalation were thus effectively ruled out. The other early peace option -- declining to intervene, and leaving South Vietnam to its fate -- is a subject well worthy of consideration in its own right, but as stated earlier it lies outside the scope of this discussion.
The second precondition to successful negotiations, as noted above, is that both parties must be able to meet some minimal set of objectives through negotiation. "Minimal" is an important operative term here. On some level, even an unconditional surrender, as of the Axis powers in World War II, represents successful attainment of
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