Russian Transformation & American Support

Introduction and Statement of Purpose

American foreign policy in general, and America's use of foreign aid or assistance in particular, has always been understood as reflective of both domestic and international political, security, economic and military concerns (Clad & Stone, 1993). Periodic electoral shifts in the period since the end of World War II have resulted in ideologically inspired shifts in aid policy, as in the abrupt tilt toward free-market development after 1981 and the beginning of the Reagan years; the collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1989, perhaps the major event shaping American foreign policy and aid decisions in the latter half of the century, also resulted in dramatic changes in America's bilateral and multilateral assistance programs (Clad & Stone, 1993). Regardless, however, how American foreign aid and assistance programs have been oriented, they have served as ideological and political vehicles destined to reinforce American principles and to acquire "friends" for the United States, leading to reduction of risks to domestic security. This was the case under the Marshall Plan, and remains the case today (Nincic, 1988).

Scholars have argued that the United States and most other nations employ foreign policy and assistance as strategic elements designed to achieve national security goals (Nincic, 1988). It is the purpose of the present study to examine the use of and shifts in A

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c as well as political reform of Russia was the key to the reform of other formerly Soviet states. The Bush administration pushed through Congress a relatively small program of assistance. This included a package devised by Senators Sam Nunn (D-Georgia) and Richard Lugar (R-Indiana) to appropriate money to assist with the dismantling of Russia's strategic arsenal (Hyland, 1999). Additionally, the United States led the Group of Seven (G-7) to approve a package of $24 billion in aid, much of which was never dispersed. A standby loan from the IMF was also offered, with heavy conditions attached, and those bilateral assistance programs offered to Russia by the United States were mainly in credits for exports (Hyland, 1999). It was apparent by 1992 when Bush was replaced by Bill Clinton in the White House that American aid to Russia was not accomplishing its primary purpose of supporting meaningful market reforms (Wedel, 2000). The United States had made aid in support of market reform in Russia and other Central and Eastern European countries its chief priority, obligating more dollars to economic restructuring, including privatization and development of the private sector, than to any other single effort. Lancaster (2000
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Some common words found in the essay are:
Soviet Union, Eastern European, Russia Clinton, Boris Yeltsin, Eastern Europe, Reagan Administration, Clinton Administration, Bilateral ODA, Putin Russia's, Office USGAO, foreign aid, foreign policy, aid russia, american foreign, wedel 2000, soviet union, hyland 1999, private sector, foreign aid russia, american foreign policy, former soviet, clinton administration, former soviet union, clad stone 1993, official aid flows,
Approximate Word count = 7905
Approximate Pages = 32 (250 words per page)

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