ike oneself, and with whom one can communicate. At this level, there is no question that other people exist and that one is certain that they do" (234-235).
The objectivist would argue that intentionality does not fulfill certain requirements of philosophical certainty with respect to existence. From the perspective of the objectivist, his is a basic flaw in the phenomenologist's view of reality. To the objectivist, philosophy has meaning only insofar as it can declare, and give evidence supporting that declaration, that an object exists objectively or not. Considering the example of the individual with a severed limb imagining that the limb still exists in the individual's consciousness, the phenomenologist can only arrive at what the objectivist would see as an ambiguous conclusion:
What this means [from the phenomenological perspective] is that, for the person concerned, this limb is both present and absent. That is, it is not a matter of the limb really being present, but being imagined to be present. . . . Rather, there is a genuine ambiguity i
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