n a federal intentional infliction of emotional distress case, Secretary, United States Department of Hous. and Urban Dev. v. Wilson, No. 03-98-0692-8, 2000 988268) (H.H.D. A.L.J. July 19, 2000), a civil action under the Fair Housing Act was held to lie against a party which over the Internet made public hate threats against plaintiff. The state tort of slander or defamation still exists with respect to maliciously false statements made over the Internet, etc. Therefore, it cannot be said intentional torts cannot, as a matter of law, be committed over the Internet.
It is unclear from the pleading precisely what sort of intentional tort defendants allegedly committed. The court might rule for plaintiffs on the grounds that technically they have not stated a cause of action. However, the allegations in substance amount to a claim that Phishy invaded plaintiffs' privacy and caused their confidential bank and credit information to be abused. These are clearly recognized causes of action outside the Internet.
A triable factual issue exists as to whether Phishy knew or had reason to know that its conduct was likely to cause harm to plaintiffs. It may not, as the court points out, "have known or had reason to know that perpetrators of fraud would purchased the mail database." There is, however, at least some evidence that it knew that it was facilitating such a fraud and did so at least recklessly.
The draft disposition likewise holds that no action lies against either defendant on strict liability grounds. Manufacturers have been held liable to third party consumers for inherent defects in their products which are the physical and proximate cause of harm to them even where negligence cannot be proven. See, for example, Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal. 2d 453, 105 P.2d 436 (1944). However, the trial court in its draft disposition states "the flirtation with strict liability has given way to negligence as the pr...