rs and others that go to make up the standards of judicial restraint. Perhaps the deepest cri de coeur he uttered from the bench concerned the obligation to sublimate personal attitudes in rendering judgment on the validity of legislation (Kurland, 1971, p. 5).
Two subsidiary issues arise when the issue of judicial restraint arises. The first is the concept of judicial review in general. The term achieved resonance in Marbury v. Madison, which marked the first time the Supreme Court declared an act of Congress (Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, to be exact) unconstitutional. The overriding constitutional principle embedded into the decision was this: Since the Constitution of the United States is the supreme law of the land, it must have the weight to overrule laws made by Congress that conflict with it. Further, the Supreme Court is uniquely suited to reviewing whether such conflict exists; the Court's duty and right under the Constitution was to preserve, not change, the Constitution, and to establish its own principles for interpretation of the Constitution. Implicit in that role was the idea that government actions and policies found to be in conflict with the Constitution were subject to review, and more, that such review was specifically and exclusively the province of the judiciary (Clinton, 1989). The degree to which the Court ought to nullify or interpret acts of Congress vis-a-vis the constitution marks the debate on judicial restraint.
The second subsidiary issue that arises in respect of the concept of judicial self-restraint is the notion of stare decisis. This is the name given to the Supreme Court practice of allowing decisions of lower courts or of Supreme Courts of earlier periods to stand as law and not be overturned. The doctrine of restraint holds that earlier judicial decisions should be upheld wherever possible. The whole range of issues relating to judicial self-restraint, however, have always been s...