rther compelling governmental interests." The Court began applying an intermediate scrutiny standard to gender classification situations in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), a case which had nothing to do with admission to colleges but rather to an Idaho probate statute giving preference to men over women. It was applied as well in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), a case involving an Oklahoma law under which women at age 18 could buy low alcohol beer but men could not do so until they reached age 21, and in Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 715 (1982), a case involving the exclusion of men from women's nursing schools. In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), which dealt with the automatic eligibility for wives but not husbands of servicemen for dependency allowances, the strict scrutiny standard was applied, but after Frontiero and until Virginia both the Warren Burger and William Rehnquist Courts reverted to the intermediate scrutiny standard in gender-based equal protection cases
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