nt of Congress in the matter is not known. The first case litigated under this statute was Barnes v. Train some ten years after passage, and the District Court of the District of Columbia rejected the suit as not being the type intended by the Act. The next case was a year later in Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. in which two female employees claimed constructive discharge as a result of physical and verbal sexual advances, and the Arizona Federal District Court rejected the suit, again as not being what was intended by the Act.
In the 1976 case Tomkins v. Public Service Electric and Gas Co., a federal court strengthened the Arizona argument, but the courts began to change direction later that year. In Williams v. Saxbe, the D.C. Federal Court held that sexual harassment was actionable under Title VII and that retaliatory acts by a supervisor toward a female employee for refusing his sexual advances constituted sex discrimination. The 1977 case of Barnes v. Costle held that the plaintiff could establish a prima facie case by showing that sexual favors were requested by the supervisor as a factor in job-retention. Tomkins was also overturned that year, establishing two necessary elements for a prima facie case: 1) sexual advances were imposed as a condition of employment; and 2) these sexual advances were imposed by the employer in a sexually discriminatory manner.
After Harris v. Forklift, plaintiffs no longer have to prove that they suffered an emotional injury any longer. They need only show that their employer allowed a hostile or abusive work environment, within certain parameters defining what is hostile:
These may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance (Harris v. Forklift 371).
Employers can take heart from this ruling to the...