ehavior is tenuous.
Nimmer also challenges the "universal pragmatists" who believe reform must be directed at the fluid and personal decisions of judges and attorneys. This assumption is faulty for Nimmer because it depends on the personality of the reformer, thereby making the reform unique and preventing its replication. Finally, Nimmer questions the administrative law assumption, under which the key to judicial reform is found "through the manipulation of intra-agency policies and procedures." Although this assumption is unwarranted for a number of reasons, its failure to consider that policies and procedures cannot be enforced without cooperation from everyone in the system, not just agency officials.
Church likewise challenges a number of assumptions. Although Nimmer's book focuses on reform and systemic change, Church's book focuses on the pace of litigation in urban trial courts. The assumptions challenged by Church therefore differ somewhat from those challenged by Nimmer. Church particularly challenges the assumption that delay, which he defines as "excessive case processing time" is attributable to court size, judicial caseload, the seriousness of cases handled, or the rate of jury trials. He believes that explanations of delay must be found elsewhere. He asserts, for example, that it is necessary to examine alternative strategies for reduction of delay such as the calendaring system, the criminal charging process, or the management of criminal litigation. Finally, Church generally challenges the assumptions that justice is impossible to dispense with speed and that delay is caused by an inherited backlog of pending cases.
Nimmer, like Church, offers alternative assumptions and ideas which he believes must be pondered. His overreaching idea is that reform must take account of several important variables: the behavior of attorneys and judges, the role of discretion, the existence of constituencies...