ions he draws from them. If we fail to do so--if we accept his premises and inferences, but reject his conclusion as unacceptable--we will be left with a paradox, and will have to doubt the possibility of defining self-consistant moral rules in this case. In fact, however, we will suggest that his argument is logically flawed; that in fact he engages in dramatic conclusion-jumping by urging us to agree to something that seems unobjectionable, and then treating it as if we had agreed to something quite different.
Before proceeding, we should deal with some secondary issues raised in Singer's article. He acknowledges that his proposed doctrine could have contrary economic side effects. A society that rejected consumerism and affluence to the degree he asks might operate at so much lower a productive level that a greater proportion of giving at that level would amount to less than a more modest level of giving in a wealthier society (p. 843). He also mentions other environmental, and even economic objections to a consumerist society (p. 842). All of these issues are tangential to his central argument, and need not be considered here.
Let us consider, then, the moral standard which Singer wishes to ask of us. In its stronger form, he argues that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it" (p. 836). He proceeds to define a sacrifice of comparable moral importance as "causing something equally bad to happen, or doing something that is wrong in itself, or failing to promote some moral good, comparable in significance to the bad thing we can prevent" (p. 836). In its weaker form, his argument substitutes "significant" for "comparable" moral significance. He does not define "significant" in this context, but we must judge him to intend some moral sacrifice that is considerable, though not as great as the moral h...