t with religious activity in this case is pervasive" (Lee at 587). Though Lemon is often cited, and the District Court relied upon it here, Lemon's precedential value is actually very limited. The Court once described it as only a "signpost" (Gunther, 1991, p. 1503-04). Instead, Kennedy relied on Engel, finding the state's decision to have prayer at the graduation ceremony little different from a state-mandated prayer in class. Kennedy emphasized the coercive nature of the exercise, particularly among primary and secondary school students, declaring it "beyond disputeàthat government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion" (Lee at 587).
Kennedy delineated the state's involvement: First, the principal decided that an invocation and a benediction should be given at graduation. Second, the state decided that a rabbi should perform the blessing, thus favoring a particular religion and creating the potential for divisiveness (Lee at 588). The school district argued it had addressed the latter issue by making the prayer "nonsectarian." Kennedy dismissed that claim, declaring unconstitutional any government undertaking to produce a prayer at an event where students "for all practical purposes are obliged to attend" (Lee at 589).
Justice Souter took a different approach in his concurring opinion (Lee at 609-632). Souter saw a more complex case, and an opportunity. He used his concurring opinion in Lee to not only make a persuasive argument for the outcome in this case, but also to offer a compelling reply to two of the criticisms that had been leveled at the Court's establishment clause decisions. Souter addressed whether the state can favor religion over non-religion, and whether state coercion of religious conformity is permitted (Lee at 609).
Justice Blackmun, however, also wrote a concurring opinion. After surveying the precedents, Blackmun applied the Lemon test and came to the same result....