que. This, the first of three communiques (culminating in Reagan's 1982 arms-to-Taiwan legislation), would enable Nixon and Kissinger to open ties to China (Manning & Przystup 14). Dubbed the "one China" policy, the Shanghai Communique was drafted to placate an indignant China that intended to re-unify with Taiwan (Chang 11). The joint statement claimed that "The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China", going on to claim most importantly that: "The United States does not challenge that position" (Manning and Przystup 14).
Of critical importance was the fact that the Nixon administration was, by careful wording, not in fact endorsing the Chinese position; rather, by not challenging it, Nixon was using slippery diplomacy to address the Taiwanese problem while shelving it simultaneously. By 1973, the full effects of the Shanghai Communique could not be fully assessed, though Taiwan was now dangling precipitously from the "one China" precipice. This unease was exacerbated over the coming years; Taiwan would not find relief in the form of diplomacy until 1979
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