U.S. War in the Arabian Gulf
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The United States and its allies are currently on the edge of war in the Arabian Gulf. Indeed, from a strategic and political perspective, it could be said that the U.S. and Iraq are already at war, even though shots are not being fired and body bags are not being flown home. The use of U.S. naval ships to bar shipping into or out of Iraq through the Arabian Gulf is called "enforcement of United Nations sanctions," but this is amere term of art; it is in fact a naval blockade, traditionally an act of war. More broadly, the two countries are locked in an armed confrontation from which neither can simply walk away, but which must be settled by either fighting or negotiations, either of which will lead to victory for one side or the other, or to some ambiguous intermediate result.1 The current Congressional and public debate over the choice of offensive military action or continued reliance on sanctions and a defensive position in Saudi Arabia is not really a debate between "war" and "peace," but a debate over which is the best means of bending Iraq's Saddam Hussein to the U.S. will. Since the U.S. is already at war in a broad strategic sense, and might soon be involved in actual combat action against Iraq, it is worth considering American options in the Arabian Gulf in the light of strategic theory. The classic exposition of this theory is Carl von Clausewitz' great work On War. The balance of this essay is a discussion of the Arabian Gulf situation in the
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November, of nearly doubling its forces deployed on the Kuwait front from about 250,000 to about 450,000.
In a world of ideal war, Clausewitz points out, there should logically be no reason for delay in military operations. Time must favor one side or the other; if it favors Iraq the U.S. should strike at once, or vice versa. Why, then, has the crisis already dragged out as long as it has? The reason, Clausewitz argues, is that war is not a matter of simple polarity (pp. 81 84). First of all, the offensive and the defensive are not equal; the defense, other factors being equal, generally has a great advantage (pp. 83 84). Iraq has had much opportunity to strike as the U.S. built up its forces but to do so would mean abandoning its dug in positions in Kuwait in favor of a war in the open. But in the war with Iran, the Iraqis were at their best in defending positions, and less effective in attack, while a war in the open would be more favorable to the use of U.S. air power.
A simplistic reading of von Clausewitz especially the emphasis on destruction of the enemy's army, and on the use of maximum force towards that end, would seem to argue for a swift frontal assault against the Iraqi forces in Kuwai
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Approximate Word count = 1765
Approximate Pages = 7 (250 words per page)
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