Consent & Political Obligation

Both Locke and Rousseau assumed that residence in a state implied tacit consent but Simmons does not agree with their assessment (Simmons 95). He says that this cannot be reasonably assumed because continued residence would them imply a "lack of response to a clearly presented 'choice situation' allowing for consent or dissent." This choice is not available to most people. Simmons points out that if consent is the only ground of political obligation, a government would need the consent of its citizens to maintain its legitimacy, and the only way to gain

widespread political obligation from the citizens would be to give them a choice situation (96).

Simmons adds that in this case, each citizen would be aware he had consented to the authority of the government, and would have no doubts about how to behave in political matters (Simmons 96). Presenting him with a choice might heighten his awareness of being a member of a community, and knowing that each of his fellow citizen's was also aware of this fact, might engender trust and cooperation. This makes the point of residence an important issue, says Simmons.

Simmons points to the argument of Hume, that residence can never be considered tacit consent to the government's rule because it is always possible for self-professed revolutionaries, spies, anarchists, gangsters, and outlaws to reside within a state, and to suggest that these people have tacitly agreed to accept the rule of the government is utter nonsense (

Related Essays

Locke and Rousseau .... Klosko says that these two arguments do not hold up in terms of residence in a state invoking tacit consent and political obligation (Klosko 680-681). .... (3136 13 )

Gratitude .... The great flaw of consent theory, says Klosko, is that .... and Klosko, believes thoroughly in political obligations of .... He considers this an obligation of gratitude .... (2548 10 )

Conditions of Gratitude .... The great flaw of consent theory, says Klosko, is that .... and Klosko, believes thoroughly in political obligations of .... He considers this an obligation of gratitude .... (2548 10 )

Analyses of Rights .... more sophisticated version that the obligation exists even .... The experience of political society as an aspect of .... It implies the individual's consent to have that .... (1424 6 )

Political Change in the Soviet Union .... the ultimate authority to which political obligation is owed .... the first duty of political leaders was .... 1856) democracy advanced without their consent or knowledge .... (4754 19 )

while and then the state demands that he either consent or emigrate (Klosko 681-682). If it is assumed that the state has provided his benefits whether or not he consents, then threatening to return him to a state without these benefits should satisfy the independence condition. Traditional social contract theory considered that a person receiving no benefits from the state is in a "state of nature" and so returning the individual to a "state of nature" rather than having him leave the country would satisfy the independence condition. Benefit deprivation schemes could therefore serve as an alternative to leaving the country (Klosko 681). In Athens, those who did not become citizens could still stay in the state: they just did not enjoy the privileges of citizens such as voting and legal privileges. Walzer believes that a parallel can be drawn between the status of aliens living permanently in some societies and individuals who do not fully consent to their governments. A common privilege of international law in the 18th and 19th centuries was that the obligations and privileges of citizens and resident aliens differed. According to Hall, an alien had neither the privileges nor the responsibilities of a subject, and wa

Category: Government - C