to counsel is expressly limited to criminal proceedings.
Until 1963 the right of criminal defendants to counsel in state court proceedings was limited to cases involving capital crimes under the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabama (1932) 287 U.S. 45. The Supreme Court held in Betts v. Brady (1942) 304 U.S. 458 that the provisions of the Sixth Amendment were not otherwise applicable to state court proceedings. The Warren Court held in Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 355 that indigent defendants charged with felonies in state criminal trials were entitled to be represented by counsel, a right which the Court said was one of the fundamental rights which were essential to a fair trial, which was guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment and which was applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment.
The ruling in Gideon did not satisfy all the needs of criminal defendants for access to counsel because many convictions were obtained through pre-trial confessions or through plea bargaining. The holdings in Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) 378 U.S. 478, and Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, "extended the right to state provided counsel effectively to the point of arrest."
Although the California courts and the legislature moved promptly to comply with the above referenced and other decisions of the Supreme Court with respect to the constitutionally-guaranteed right of adult criminal defendants to counsel, the courts traditionally have treated juvenile offenders differently. For example, in People v. Lara, 67 Cal.2d 365, 62 Cal.Rptr. 586, 432 P.2d 202 (1967), a defendant who was less than 18 years old at the time of his arrest was convicted of first degree murder and forcible kidnapping, largely on the basis of a confession obtained from him when he was interrogated by the police. He had been asked whether he wished to have an attorney present and had declined. On appeal, the Califor...