hat metaphysics and theology are transparent attempts to make altruism look more reasonable than it is. Yet such skeptics have their own theories of human nature. They . . . claim that there is something common to all human beings--for example, the will to power, or libidinal impulses") (Rorty, 1989, p. xiii).
The next phase of philosophy, says Rorty, was marked by those who tried to transcend this conflict. These philosophers have argued essentially that there is no such thing as an essential truth with respect to human nature, that reason is clearly limited, and that socialization plays the biggest role in defining such terms as justice. Rorty says that these philosophers have adopted the historicist approach which "has helped free us, gradually but steadily, from theology and metaphysics . . . It has helped us substitute Freedom for Truth as the goal of thinking and of social progress" (Rorty, 1989, p. xiii).
Rorty believes this evolution to be a positive one, but he adds that it has not yet solved the public-private conflict. He summarizes the continuing struggle: "Historicists in whom the desire for self-creation, for private autonomy, dominates . . . still tend to see socialization . . . as antithetical to something deep within us. Historicists in whom the desire for a more just and free human community dominates . . . are still inclined to see the desire for private perfection as infected with 'irrationalism' and 'aestheticism'" (Rorty, 1989, pp. xiii-xiv).
Rorty does not try to solve this apparent impasse, but instead tries to honor both camps. He dismisses efforts to find a theory which will bring together the two conflicting camps, and argues instead that we should see the declarations of both camps as equally important and tenable. Both self-creation and human solidarity deserve respect as proposed aims for human endeavor, but it must also be admitted that they are "forever incommensurable."
The entit...