cordingly, his goal is not to arm himself with compelling arguments that might acquit him decisively but to illuminate the authentic character of the arguments that have been presented. The most dramatic instance of this occurs with regard to the charge of atheism on one hand and the belief in rival deities on the other:
You cannot be believed, Meletus, even, I think, by yourself.
The man appears to me, gentlemen of the jury, highly
insolent and uncontrolled. He seems to have made this
deposition out of insolence, violence and youthful zeal. He
is like one who composed a riddle and is trying it out:
"Will the wise Socrates realize that I am jesting and
contradicting myself, or shall I deceive him and others?" I
think he contradicts himself in the affidavit, as if he
said: "Socrates is guilty of not believing in gods but
believing in gods," and surely that is the part of a jester!
The psychology that informs Meletus's insolence, violence, and youthful zeal is not explored; in the event, Socrates appears to understand that the climate of juror opinion is such that exploration would be fruitless.
...