ses, the fact that CRM was not embraced quickly by pilots should not be surprising. Some saw it as a serious compromise of the captain's authority, an open door to anarchy in the cockpit. Some argued that CRM would allow the crew to challenge the captain's decisions constantly; that if anything ever got done in the cockpit, it would be by committee or by default."
Further, the CRM concept challenged patterns of behavior that had been "shaped by years of training and tradition that emphasized that above all, the captain was in charge. à Training emphasized the primacy of the captain. Teamwork was not encouraged. 'The captain may not be right, but the captain is always the captain,' went the old maxim. Obviously, before CRM could change the captain, the way the captain was trained also would have to change."
Airline managements eventually recognized the futility of the "pop psychology" approach to the introduction of CRM as it had been structured by the human factor practitioners. Airline managements responded to this recognition by restructuring, as opposed to abandoning, their CRM programs. Nevertheless, much damage had been done among airline flight personnel with respect to the credibility of the CRM concept.
The objective of the proposed study will be to assess strength of the support for and opposition to the CRM concept among cockpit personnel in 1997. This objective will include an identification of the sources of such support and opposition.
Three research questions will be investigated in the proposed study. These research questions will be as follows:
1. Do the perceptions captains and cockpit personnel other than captains vary within respect to the contention that CRM, as opposed to the traditional concept of the captain as the single decision-maker in the cockpit, will lead to increased in-flight safety during non emergency conditions?
2. Do the perceptions captains and cockpit personnel othe...