usseau's natural man will underpin the larger, even fundamental, distinctions between these two thinkers.
As illustrated above, a Hobbesian state of nature cannot play host to a guiding morality of any sort; human moods and desires- our appetites- largely motivate actions in the state of nature, compelling individuals to behave not according to Right and Wrong, but rather in accordance with the dictates of survival. In this, there is no ultimate good, or summum bonum, according to Hobbes; man contends with a string of appetites that in turn prompt actions, many of which may be rationally conceived (Hampsher-Monk 23). These appetites do not point towards any one, highest entity or thing to possess. Rather, it is simply the power to satisfy one's own desires (whatever these may be) that is itself desirable. This, for Hobbes, is the cherished "power of a manà to obtain some future apparent Good" (Hobbes 43). Other people can thwart our desires, and subsequently, impede our efforts to acquire whatever these perceived, apparent Goods happen to be. Conflicts arise in a state of nature wherever two or more people come to desire the same thing; such occasions will not be rare, as it is reasonable to assume that people will regularly covet and strive after the same sorts of things. Ultimately, these conflicts over perceived Goods can escalate, resulting in violence or even death.
A Rousseauian reading of these ideas will reject the notion that such dramatic conflict
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