Finding the right balance of retribution versus reconciliation in a transition to a democratic regime is a complex issue. On one hand, human rights violations must be punished, if only to preserve a basic sense of justice in the country in question. On the other hand, rigorous prosecution of such violations may be beyond the means of a new government struggling to establish stability. In many cases, the potential for serious intra-state conflict between the democratic government and the military cannot be underestimated. Nevertheless, minimal legal reprisals against human rights violators of past regimes must be pursued.
Argentina is an instructive example of a democracy whose troubled relationship with its military continued well into the new regime. The transfer of power in Argentina came about as a result of the collapse of a military junta in 1982. President Raul Alfonsin, who had campaigned on a human rights platform, set about instituting reforms aimed at significantly reducing the power of the military. Part of this reduction was budgetary: "The Ministry of Defense estimates that the combined expenses of the defense sector were 5.6 percent of GNP in 1981 and that they were reduced to 3 percent in 1985" (Stepan, 1988, p. 80). In addition to personnel cuts, Alfonsin lowered military salaries.
The military was stunned by Alfonsin's austerity measures, arguing that they constituted shoddy treatment, contributed to low morale and forced many officers into conditions of economic hardship. As a result of Alfonsin's reforms, applications to the Argentine military academy plunged. Unwittingly, Alfonsin had set the stage for a potentially explosive showdown between his government and the military: "Scarred and divided societies need to face the truth about their recent history, but there should then be a process of healing that draws a line between the unfree past and the democratic future" (Benomar, 1993, p. 5).
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