the rest of the world put together. (Russia still has a substantial fleet of nuclear submarines, but it is unlikely this force remains serviceable, and it is profoundly irrelevant to Russia's present-day security concerns.)
To understand the character of the current world geopolitical system, therefore, it is necessary first and foremost to understand the nature, strength, and limitations of hegemonic maritime power. In the remainder of this essay, the historical experience of maritime power will be briefly examined, followed by a sketch of a recent instance of such power in action, the Persian Gulf War.
It is not necessary for a state to be an island in order for it to be a maritime state, but an island state enjoys great advantages in pursuing a maritime strategy. Put simply, an island can be invaded only by crossing the sea, which means the invader must be able to win by sea before he can win by land. Continental nations must generally assign the lion's share of their military resources to land forces, in order to secure their frontiers; in contrast, in the ideal case an island state needs no army at all, and can commit its entire military resources to a navy. Given states of comparable resources, the island will therefore easily achieve naval superiority.
Moreover, naval superiority allows an island maritime state not only to defend its sea frontiers but to dominate the seaways in the interests of its own trade; in turn the wealth from trade helps support the fleet, while also providing a large merchant marine that functions directly or indirectly as a naval reserve. Insular maritime powers from Athens to Britain have characteristically enjoyed not only a quantitative superiority but a qualitative superiority; they had not only more ships, but better ships and better crews. (The United States has no merchant marine of consequence, but its industrial power has achieved the same effect.)
Insular maritime stat...