THE SIX-DAY WAR JUNE 5-10, 1967 This research p

The Arab-Israeli conflict, which has resulted in four wars and periods of great tension, communal violence and political and economic change throughout the Middle East, was primarily produced by events and forces generated outside that region. Zionism, or the demand for a homeland for the Jews in Palestine, became a reality, as a result of the effects of the two world wars, the destruction of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 and the Nazi holocaust, which accelerated large-scale Jewish immigration into Palestine and produced a head-on collision with Arab nationalism.

The British, who had promised the Zionists a Jewish homeland under the Balfour Declaration of 1917 while at the same time making promises to the Arabs during World War I which it failed to carry out, attempted to limit Jewish immigration to Palestine, which nevertheless exceeded 350,000 in the late 1930s and encroached on Arab interests. Torn between its need for Middle Eastern oil and its promises to the Zionists, Britain found itself impossibly stretched after World War II and in 1948 withdrew from Palestine. After the new state of Israel was proclaimed in 1948 and a hastily contrived partit

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ere demanding a greater share of power. In 1966-1967, the Israeli economy was in recession. In mid-May, a divided Israeli Cabinet approved tentative steps taken by Eshkol at the urging of Israeli Defense Force (IDF) Chief of Staff Yizhak Rabin to begin partial mobilization and to strength IDF forces facing the Egyptians in Sinai. But the Israelis were genuinely confused about Nasser's intentions. Lacquer (1968) says that Nasser "stumbled into" war (p. 229). Riding high on a wave of Arab xenophobia and calls for jihad, or holy war, Lacquer says, Nasser concluded "he had more to lose from inaction than from brinkmanship," yet, at the same time, he "acted in a fit of anger and annoyance" (p. 231). Lacquer says that "it seems only that Fatah and perhaps the Syrians wanted war" (p. 229). Hammel (1992) says that "it is now known that Egypt . . . was not particularly willing to go war against Israel. Not just yet" (p. 39). Meanwhile, the Israelis were taking no chances. On the diplomatic front, while the United States kept warning the Israelis not to fire the first shot, the Israelis concluded that the Americans would keep the Russians out of the impending conflict. Abba Eban, the foreign minister, discouraged by the preoccupation of
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Some common words found in the essay are:
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Approximate Word count = 2396
Approximate Pages = 10 (250 words per page)