Probable Cause vs. Reasonable Suspicion

In 1968, the U.S. Supreme Court announced a new standard for police conduct in the landmark case of Terry v. Ohio. Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority, held that police did not need "probable cause" to stop and frisk a citizen on the street. Instead, the Court imposed a lesser standard, called "reasonable suspicion." The Supreme Court has revisited this issue many times in the intervening three decades. This paper will examine those cases, and the extent to which the justices followed Terry in writing subsequent "stop and frisk" opinions.

The Terry decision created an exception to the law of arrest, which is rooted in the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The Fourth Amendment requires probable cause for a lawful arrest. If a court determines that the police lacked probable cause, the remedy is to invalidate the arrest and exclude any evidence seized therefrom (the Exclusionary Rule).

Terry sought that remedy after a detective (McFadden) stopped him on the street and conducted a pat-down search, which revealed a weapon. Terry appealed his conviction for carrying a concealed weapon, arguing that the gun should have been excluded from evidence because McFadden lacked probable cause. The trial court disagreed, distinguishing "between an investigatory 'stop' and an arrest, and between a 'frisk' of the outer clothing for weapons and a full-blown search for evidence of crime."

The Supreme Court upheld that ruling and created a new standard for "stop and

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urt addressed this issue again in Brown v. Texas. The police observed Brown walking away from another man in an area known for drug dealing. The police stopped Brown and asked him his name and what he was doing. He refused to answer, so the police arrested him. A trial court convicted Brown under a Texas statute that made it a crime to refuse to identify oneself to an officer "who has lawfully stopped him and requested the information." The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. Chief Justice Burger, writing for a unanimous Court, declared that the reasonableness of a seizure depends on "a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers." Here, the Court struck that balance in the defendant's favor because the police lacked a "reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts." Though the Court decided Brown in a manner consistent with Terry, its language indicates equal adherence to the balancing test used in Mimms. In Michigan v. Sitz (1990), the Court applied these standards to a new law enforcement device, the sobriety checkpoint. Police in Michigan set up a checkpoint on the road. All cars were stopped, and the officers briefly examined the driv

Category: Government - P