eover, the percentage raise did not keep up with inflation, so those workers earning the minimum wage actually lost buying power. Mexico City's archbishop called the increase ôcriminalö because it amounted to a pay cut (Weintraub, 1998, p. M2).
How can U.S. workers compete against such wages? They cannot, as the garment industry can attest. In 1992, only 12 percent of American garment manufacturers did business in Mexico. By 1998, nearly two-thirds had moved some or all of their operations south of the borderùand that was before NAFTA phased out textile trade barriers, a process that began on January 1, 1999. Soon that figure could be 100 percent, considering the relative sowing costs (35 cents versus $1.20) in each locale (Lee, 1998, pp. D6-D7).
All these jobs are moving amidst otherwise happy times in the fashion industry. Los Angeles, for example, has experienced a boom in fashion manufacturing during the 1990s, yet its employment has held steady at approximately 122,000. Meanwhile, textile workers in the Carolinas and along the Texas-Mexico border have paid a heavy price, even though they make a meager living by American standards (Lee, 1998, pp. D6-D7).
That exodus will only accelerate if NAFTA is extended to the rest of the Americas. Wages in parts of Central and South America are even lower than in Mexico. Soon it will be a race to the bottom, and even Mexico will fall behind. The lack of true democracy in many countries will result in many Mexico-style devaluations. Leaders may find no better way to attract businesses than to lower costs, regardless of the pain wrought on their populace. NAFTA includes no guarantees on this front, and thus is not only a bad deal for the U.S. but unjust for much of Latin America.
NAFTA has made the rich even wealthier, in both the U.S. and Mexico. A study of NAFTA's impact on Southern California, conducted by a professor at the University of California at Santa Cruz, f...