cussed the meaning of some terms contained in the statute, terms such as ônational origin.ö The only reference in the Congressional debates came from Congressman Roosevelt, who defined ônational originö simply as ôthe country from which you or your forebears came.ö As a result of Congress' inattention, government agencies and the federal courts were left to grapple with the difficult task of interpreting such terms.
To implement Title VII, Congress created an administrative agency in the Executive Branch called the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Ultimately, however, enforcement of Title VII depended on the judiciary. As expected, plaintiffs flocked to the courthouse to allege discrimination by employers, and also as expected, the U.S. Supreme Court produced numerous opinions that transformed the simple prohibitions of Title VII into an extensive body of law. Those precedents, as followed by the courts and later codified into statute by Congress, have created two distinct avenues (disparate treatment or disparate impact) for plaintiffs under Title VII.
A disparate treatment action is the traditional employment discrimination case. An example of such a suit would be when a plaintiff alleges that an employer refused to hire her because of her race. Disparate treatment cases involve ôindividuals challenging discrete acts of intentional discrimination.ö Justice Stewart wrote in Teamsters v. U.S. that disparate treatment ôis the most easily understood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment.ö
The Supreme Court outlined the standards for such a cause of action in McDonnell Douglas v. Green and restated those factors 20 years later in St. Mary's...