uying access and influence in all aspects of legislative decision-making (Miller 18).
Just how this system works can be seen by looking at what has happened to the House Republican freshmen who were elected to change the way business is done in Washington and who dubbed their class the "reform class." In fact, it hasn't taken many of these freshmen long to learn their way around the influence-money culture of Capitol Hill. During the first half of 1995--their
first six months in Washington--these freshmen received $5 million from special-interest PACs. The average freshman raised 45 percent of his or her campaign money from PACs in the first half of 1995. Compare that to their 1994 election campaigns when as open seat and challenger candidates PACs provided just 22 percent of their funds.
Many of these freshman have become "instant insiders"--as dependent on PACs as their well-seasoned colleagues. Business Week recently editorialized, "[T]he greediest gorgers on PAC money these days are the freshmen Republicans elected in 1994 on a platform of changing Washington. How sad it is to see them in Congress, shoulder to shoulder with lobbyists, thanking them for helping write legislation that will only benefit their clients" (Editor 154).
There is an inherent problem with a system in which individuals and groups with an interest in government decisions can give substantial sums of money to elected officials who have the power to make those decisions. In the current system, special-interest PAC contributions have become a dominant force in the financing of congressional campaigns. This dependence of Members of Congress, particularly in the House, on PAC contributions has seriously compromised the integrity and public credibility of the congressional decision making process (Sabato 122-125).
The explosion of PACs has resulted in a growing dependence on PAC contributions. PACs contributed a record $189 million to federal candi...