According to Rolston (1989); ôIt is admittedly difficult to pinpoint precisely what a species is, and there may be no single, quintessential way to define speciesö (210). Despite the complexities involved in fashioning an absolute definition of species, for the purposes of this analysis species will be defined according to the biological definition; ôSpecies are groups of interbeeding natural populations that are reproductively isolated from other such groupsö (Mayr 1996, 265). Perhaps even more complex than a definition of species is the answer to why, and under what circumstances, we should preserve endangered species. Typically, such questions are answered from an anthropocentric perspective, using a utilitarian framework in determining why, and under what circumstances, we should preserve endangered species. In light of different biological, sociological, and philosophical perspectives, human beings, a relative new-comer to evolutionary history, ought to respect and protect the diversity of all life forms generated through evolution.
There is typically and anthropocentric and utilitarian perspective that guides why, and under what circumstances, we preserve endangered species. Anthropocentrism typically underlies any valuation of species or any duties associated with their protection from a moral standpoint. The utilitarian perspective, according to Hampshire, is summed up as follows: ôThe preservation of species are to be aimed at and commended only in so far as human beings are, or will be, emotionally and sentimentally interestedö (Rolston 1989, 206). The utilitarian perspective offered here takes an even greater anthropocentrism when combined with the nature of rights. We do not protect species for their own sakes or a duty to protect their rights, according to Feinberg, but only in so far as their preservation is viewed as a duty to future human beings, ôWe do have duties to protect threatened species, not ...