nsiderations make the rise of pro-coups groups impossible to control in modern military organizations, ôOther aspects of the modern military that hinder control involve the difficulty of containing the institution or preventing official contacts between lower-ranking personnel and the external environment,ö (Pion-Berlin 2001, 114). We see a similar phenomenon now occurring in post-war Iraq. The insurgency being faced by U.S. troops stems from a lack of planning in dealing with thousands of Iraqi military personnel who suddenly found themselves without work and with few resources earmarked for their benefit. Such poorly planned policies build resentment and resistance in military organizations that lead to pro-coup oriented factions. As Norden argues, taking care of the military is one way to assure the minimization of hostility and resentment toward government, ôThe ideal-typical rational military would presumably minimize the possibilities for a coup because such practices as fair personnel policies and decision-making pa
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