viduals should not pursue self-interests at the expense of others: ôThe strongest of all arguments against the interference of the public with purely personal conduct, is that when it does interfere, the odds are that it interferes wrongly, and in the wrong place. On questions of social morality, or duty to othersö (Mill 102).
Mill asserts in On Liberty that individual freedom is inviolable, ôIn the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absoluteö (ôJohnö 1). Despite his belief in the absolute nature of the right of individual liberty, Mill does maintain that there are certain instances in which the legitimate state can interfere with this right. One of these times pertains to preventing injury or pain to others. In MillÆs theory of utility, the guiding principle of utility is to achieve through oneÆs actions the greatest good for the greatest numbers of people. For example, we might intervene to rob a potential Adolph Hitler or, more recently, Saddam Hussein of their power, but only in order to prevent them from bringing pain to others through self-interested pursuit. We can see how tricky and fine a line decisions to interfere with individual freedom are considered, when we remember the opposition to our deposing Saddam Hussein in many places around the world and even at home.
However, Mill makes it clear that self-protection or avoiding harm to others are legitimate cases for interfering with individual freedom: ôThat the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against h
...