cietyÆs wish for reasons of moral outrage or indignation to punish wrongs to the innocent is not reason enough ôto warrant the inference that [the criminal] and his conduct are appropriate objects of our unqualified hostility.ö Further, he sees a contradiction in the fact that societal hostility is intended as a deterrent (in any case ineffective) for future behavior by others, even as society shrinks from public executions that, as Bedau believes, are more properly deterrents.
Meanwhile there is the history of mistaken executions. In 1964, Bedau abstracted more than 70 "cases occurring in the United States since 1893, in which wrongful conviction of criminal homicide has been alleged and, in most cases, proved beyond doubt . . . [even when] carried out. By 1985, Bedau had helped document executions of some 25 innocent persons. The combination of specious theories of deterrence and potential of judicial error make Bedau conclude as a matter of logic that where capital punishment is available society incurs ôboth the risk of executing the innocent and the risk of recidivist murder, even though it is necessary to run only one of these risks.ö
Bedau rejects the validity of capital punishment as retribution out of hand, characterizing retribution advocates as really being interested in deterrence. However, his most deeply felt argument is his rejection of government power over what
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