being counted as one good thing among others'. In the second section of the chapter Aristotle arrives at a definition of the human good by considering what is the function (ergon) of man.
Hardie adds that Aristotle "hesitates between an inclusive and exclusive formulation" of happiness and that he fails "to make explicit the distinction between the comprehensive plan and the paramount end." However, Aristotle's text seems perfectly consistent with the notion of ethics as a practical science. The key statement in that regard is Aristotle's distinguishing between categories of the good: "What, then, is the good of each particular one [action]? . . . Consequently if there is any one thing that is the end of all actions, this will be the practical good--or goods, if there are more than one" (I.vii.73).
This implies that a good may be either contingent or essential. Something is contingent that is not essential; that is, if a purer expression of an aspect of ethics can be found, then that aspect is subsidiary. Aristotle positions happiness as the chief good of human life, with honor, pleasure, and reason on one hand both subsidiary and instrumental to it and on the other hand either subsidiary or instrumental. Accordingly, one performs actions for honor, pleasure, or intelligence, but selects one course of action or another with the higher purpose of happiness in mind: "On the other hand nobody chooses happiness for their sake [i.e., for the sake of subsidiary goods], or in general for any other reason [than happiness itself]" (I.vii.74).
[T]he good for man is an activity of soul in accordance with virtue, or if there are more kinds of virtue than one, in accordance with the best and most perfect kind.
There is a further qualification: in a complete lifetime. One swallow does not make a summer; neither does one day. Similarly neither can one day, or a brief space of time, make a man blessed and happy (I.vii.76; emphasis added)....