is pious (100e). In other words, piety and divine love are different values or natures. They may intersect, but they cannot be equated (100). In particular, "the pious has the quality of being loved by all the gods, but you have not yet told me what the pious is" (100)
Now Socrates proposes a second line of argument, asking whether everything that is pious is necessarily just (101), and if so, what makes the pious an attribute of the just. Euthyphro divides the just in two, saying that "what is godly and pious is the part of the just that is concerned with the care of the gods, while that concerned with the care of men is the remaining part of justice" (102).
Socrates develops three answers to this, based on different ideas of care. The first kind of care benefits what is cared for. If the godly and pious benefits the gods, then piety is aimed at improving the gods--but that is impious for of course the gods cannot be improved, and Euthyphro must reject it.
His second idea of care is service to the g
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