masses give the same account of it as the philosophers [= wise men]" (I.2.88). Aristotle's describes it as the chief or "supreme" good of human life, with honor, pleasure, and reason both subsidiary and instrumental to it. Accordingly, one performs actions for honor, pleasure, or intelligence, but selects one course of action or another with the higher purpose of happiness in mind: "Nobody chooses happiness for the sake of these things [i.e., for the sake of subsidiary goods], nor indeed as a means to anything else at all [than happiness itself]" (I.5.90).
Thus there may be political, social, or economic virtue; nevertheless, so Aristotle's argument runs, it is useful, indeed essential, to identify the virtue deemed fundamental and irreducible. That is, the fundamental virtue must be identified as being for the sake of no subsidiary or instrumental virtues, but subsidiary virtues themselves also need to be identified so as to distinguish them from the fundamental virtue, which is the supreme good. To this extent, the supreme good encases subsidiary goods, ev
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