The purpose of this essay is to critique John RawlsÆ theory of justice as a refutation of utilitarianism. It will consider how Rawls arrives at his principles of justice, and will consider whether RawlsÆ theory does refute utilitarianism. It will also consider whether RawlsÆ principles might be compatible with some form of utilitarianism, and how a utilitarian might critique RawlsÆ theory.
Rawls considers his theory of ôjustice as fairnessö to be a type of ôsocial contractö theory in the tradition of Locke, Rousseau, and Kant. That is, just as the latter said, essentially, let us consider humans to be in a state of nature as a starting point, in order to ask how human society might have originated and evolved, so does Rawls propose a hypothetical starting position from which to deduce a theory of society, for, as he says (155), ôA theory of justice depends upon a theory of society.ö All four of these philosophers propose essentially that humans have made at least an implicit social contract with one another as the basis for society.
Rawls says explicitly, ôThis original position is not, of course, thought of as an actual historical state of affairs, much less as a primitive condition of culture. It is understood as a purely hypothetical situation characterized so as to lead to a certain conception of justice.ö Rawls was not, one may hope, implying that Locke, for example, thought of the ôoriginalö social contract as an actual historical event either. If Locke had, and if the validity of Lockean theory depended on whether there actually had been a social contract at some time, then the entire American political system, which is based on Lockean theory, would be in serious trouble. However, Locke himself made clear that the historicity of the contract was not important, since every person in a society, by implicitly agreeing to obey the rules of that society, implicitly renews the social contract. (And this i...