ctivism and judicial restraint is closely related to the debate over a constrained versus dynamic court and the distinction between interpretivism and noninterpretivism or the question of whether it is ever appropriate for judges ever to import new meaning into the words of the Constitution (Hall, 1992).
In the context of this debate, the present report will consider the case of Napster, a case recently heard by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In a ruling dated February 12, 2001, the Court upheld an injunction preventing Napster from offering a large part of its services until it can develop technology or employ the means to provide music to consumers without violating existing copyright laws (Morris & Mapes, 2001).
The thesis to be advanced and explored herein is that the Court decision in the case of Napster affirms the logic of the constrained court ideology. Morris and Mapes (2001) contend that the central issue in the Napster case is copyright infringement. The Copyright Act of 1976 grants copyright holders six exclusive rights û rights that the Court held were violated by Napster in its business practices (Morris & Mapes, 2001).
The constrained court ideology was applied in the Napster case in keeping with the view that NapsterÆs actions violated the letter and the spirit of the law. Supporters of the constrained court view claim that American courts are particularly deferential to the positions of the federal government (Rosenberg, 1991). Under the terms of the Copyright Act of 1976, the U.S. Congress clearly delineated the rights of individuals and organizations to control copyrighted property. These rights are delineated as follows:
To reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or
To prepare derivative works based on the
To distribute copies or phonorecords of the
copyrighted work to the public by sale or other
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
In the c...