of Christian faiths in 1787 to hundreds of religious groups today, both Christian and non-Christian. The new sects often have collided with established churches and the ever-expanding state, thus involving both the establishment clause and the free exercise clause. Those two clauses, viewed by the framers as a clear statement of compatible goals, now seem contradictory (Tribe, 1988, pp. 1154-66).
The judiciary is responsible for determining the law (and by extension, national policy) regarding church and state because of the courtsÆ paramount authority to interpret the Constitution. The Supreme Court, however, had little to rely on while formulating this policy. The establishment clause is the declaration of a goal, not a statute. Moreover, the authors themselves could not agree on its meaning, beyond the prohibition of a state religion. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court sought direction from history, and the framersÆ reasoning still resonates today (Tribe, 1988, pp. 1159-61).
First, the framers feared excessive identification of the state with a particular church. They believed the danger was self-evident: the persecution and intolerance of religions not in favor, and the inevitable divisiveness prompted by any government that chose sides (Tribe, 1988, pp. 1155-56). The basis for their belief was the experience of the English, who had endured turmoil and violence after their break from the Roman Catholic Church.
Second, both government and religion function best when left alone. The establishment clause ensures the autonomy of both; left open is the question of whether the church or the state was more in need of protection. Roger Williams believed that ôworldly corruptionsö would destroy religion unless ôsturdy fencesö were erected (Tribe, 1988, p. 1159). Williams saw governmentÆs role as fostering a climate conducive to all religions. Indeed, that was the situation in many of the states at the time they a...