ry concern with North Korea is perhaps indicative. It is presumed to have a mere handful of relatively crude, low-yield nuclear weapons, yet these are sufficient (along with North Korea's strong conventional forces) to compel the United States to seek a negotiated solution, and to conspicuously avoid the talk of preventive war that dominated its posture toward Iraq. A little nuclear deterrence goes a long way.
A further important advantage to such deep cuts would be a reduction in global demand for and production of high-grade fissile material, reducing the risk of nuclear weapons being produced by, or falling into the hands of, "rogue states" or nonstate actors. This danger is arguably greater than that of another great-power arms race, and a strong indicator that deep cuts would enhance rather than reduce national security.
Hippel, Frank von (1997). Paring Down the Arsenal. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 53 (May-June), pp. 11-14.
States operate under two basic imperatives in seeking to secure their national security. One imperative is to maximize the total resources potentially available for defense of their interests. The other is to maximize their freedom of action in deployment of these resources to meet their goals. "Resources" in this context means not only direct military manpower and material, but economic resources that can potentially be assigned to defense, as well as domestic and international support.
These imperatives are in inherent tension. By forming alliances and cultivating international organizations, or less formally by appealing effectively to international opinion, a state can draw upon resources not under its direct control. However, precisely because those resources are not under direct control, it lacks full freedom of action in employing them, but must win the support of others. Obtaining this support almost invariably means accepting constraints on its freedom of action. The i...