The war in Iraq presents the United States and the world with a series of multi-faceted problems. Currently there is so much factionalism between Kurds, Sunnis and Shiite that the central government is incapable of reigning in violent Al Qaeda groups. These groups in some cases work in tandem with Iraqis enraged over the U.S. occupation. A conflict already unique because of these ethnic and ideological divides was made even more complex in January 2007, when President Bush announced a troop surge of more than 21,000. This paper will examine the affect of this troop surge on the conflict and then reveal that although the surge plan appears to have reduced casualties and bolstered security, it has done so at the cost of long-term effective government in Iraq. After framing the problem, it will become clear that the only solution is to integrate the Army and eventually withdraw.
In his analysis of the European state system, Charles Tilly describes the various ways states use force upon their citizens. Tilly especially emphasizes the ways states use coercion in two areas, war making and state making. War making, according to Tilly, is utilizing coercive means to kill enemies; state making is using coercion to control internal rivals (Tilly, 54).
In Iraq, the war making is over but the state making is only beginning. If the new government there can succeed in its goal to centralize authority under a national umbrella, Iraq may stand for ages as a success story for non-violent means to end conflict. If sectarian struggles continue to overwhelm the government's ability to build unity and quell the insurgency, as is the current situation, Iraq may go down as a bloody testament to the unstoppable force of uncontrolled violence.
Many of the problems with Iraq's sectarian divide stem from poor war planning. This left Iraq without the ability to monopolize military power, which in turn hampered the central government in st...