Factionalism and the Iraq War
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The war in Iraq presents the United States and the world with a series of multi-faceted problems. Currently there is so much factionalism between Kurds, Sunnis and Shiite that the central government is incapable of reigning in violent Al Qaeda groups. These groups in some cases work in tandem with Iraqis enraged over the U.S. occupation. A conflict already unique because of these ethnic and ideological divides was made even more complex in January 2007, when President Bush announced a troop surge of more than 21,000. This paper will examine the affect of this troop surge on the conflict and then reveal that although the surge plan appears to have reduced casualties and bolstered security, it has done so at the cost of long-term effective government in Iraq. After framing the problem, it will become clear that the only solution is to integrate the Army and eventually withdraw. In his analysis of the European state system, Charles Tilly describes the various ways states use force upon their citizens. Tilly especially emphasizes the ways states use coercion in two areas, war making and state making. War making, according to Tilly, is utilizing coercive means to kill enemies; state making is using coercion to control internal rivals (Tilly, 54). In Iraq, the war making is over but the state making is only beginning. If the new government there can succeed in its goal to centralize authority under a national umbrella, Iraq may stand for ages as a success story for n
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liation in the central government. The legacy of resistance to national political reconciliation is almost as strong coming from U.S. envoys as it is from recalcitrant Iraqi politicians. Sectarian divides prevented the Coalition Provisional Authority from creating a "secular, nonpartisan government" from the start when UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi tried to guide planning for an interim government in 2003. In that case, it was even a U.S. representative, Paul Bremer, sabotaging a more integrated Governing Council (Chandrasekaran, 245).
The U.S. saw just as much resistance to cooperation from Iraqis at the top levels of government. In May 2005, James Jeffrey, the coordinator of policy on Iraq, was unsuccessful in his efforts to have more Sunnis involved in the governing process. Top Shiites blocked his moves. (Woodward, State of Denial, 394). That is why the Bush administration placed more faith in bottom-up strategies.
Yet the focus on building militia groups has diverted attention from a central need of the new government, integrating anti-government fighters into the Iraqi Security Forces. As of March 2008, only 20 percent of the militias have been integrated into the ISF or been given public works jobs. To make maters
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Some common words found in the essay are:
Peter Juul, Charles Tilly, President Bush, Al Qaeda, Iraqi Army, Reconciliation Sunnis', Army Zakaria, James Dobbins, Violence Iraq, Krauthammer A27, central government, duggan peter juul, lawrence brian, korb lawrence brian, sean duggan, sean duggan peter, duggan peter, peter juul, korb lawrence, president bush, katulius sean duggan, brian katulius sean, katulius sean, 8 2008, shiite government,
Approximate Word count = 1786
Approximate Pages = 7 (250 words per page)
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