J.L. Mackie on the Problem of Theodicy
One of the most compelling issues addressed by philosophers over time is the so-called problem of evil. This problem is generally phrased in the form of a question, "why does God allow evil?" The philosopher J.L. Mackie, as described by Jonathan Westphal (30), sees a number of problems implicit in this question, among which the very existence of a theos is certainly paramount. Similarly, Mackie defines the problem of evil as focused on the argument that the existence of God or a theos is incompatible with the existence of evil - a formulation originally advanced by St. Thomas Aquinas (Westphal, 30). Mackie divides solutions to the problem of evil into two types: those that are logically adequate and those that are logically inadequate. Each of these solutions incorporates at least one of three initial propositions, namely, that God is omnibenevolent, that God is omnipotent, and that evil exists. For Mackie, if one is prepared to say that God is not wholly good or not entirely omnipotent, or that evil does not exist, then the problem of evil does not arise. Similarly, if good is not opposed to the kind of evil that exists or if there are limits to what an omnipotent being can do, then the problem of evil does not arise (Westphal, 32).
Mackie develops four solutions which he finds logically flawed or fallacious, diagnosing them with respect to the likelihood that one or more of the constituent propositions presented above is given up but in such a way that it appears to be retained and can therefore be asserted without qualification in other contexts (Westphal, 35). One of his debunked solutions, which is often offered by a theologian, is that evil is necessary as a counterpart to good. Mackie says that this denies God's goodness and that if good requires evil, then good or God is not opposed to evil (Westphal, 35).
A second fallacy that Mackie refutes is that evil is ne...